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Abstract
We estimate a model of voting in Congress that allows for dispersed information about
the quality of proposals in an equilibrium context. The results highlight the effects of
bicameralism on policy outcomes. In equilibrium, the Senate imposes an endogenous
supermajority rule on members of the House. We estimate this supermajority rule to be
about four-fifths on average across policy areas. Moreover, our results indicate that the
value of the information dispersed among legislators is significant, and that in equilib-
rium a large fraction of House members (40-50 %) vote in accordance with their private
information. Taken together, our results imply a highly conservative Senate, in the sense
that proposals are enacted into law only when it is extremely likely that their quality is
high.
JEL classification numbers: D72, D78, C13
Key words: bicameralism, legislatures, roll call votes, information transmission, MCMC,
finite mixture model
The not-so-popular branch: bicameralism as a
counter-majoritarian device.
Matias Iaryczower, Gabriel Katz, and Sebastian Saiegh
“The necessity of a Senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single
and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent pas-
sions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious
resolutions . . . ” James Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 62.
1 Introduction
One of the main arguments for bicameralism is that a two-tier legislature can improve
the quality of public policy vis-a`-vis a unicameral system (see Tsebelis and Money (1997)
and references therein). Evaluating the quality of proposals is indeed a key consideration
in legislative settings. As numerous examples and a vast literature show (see Krehbiel
(1991)), two key points seem to be largely uncontroversial. First, most issues decided in
Congress have a common value dimension, be it the technical merit of the proposal or its
appropriateness for the given state of the environment. Second, the information about
these common value components is dispersed throughout the members of Congress: no
individual knows the whole truth, but each individual has some valuable information to
improve the quality of legislation (see also Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Epstein and
O’Halloran (1999), Londregan (1999, 2000), and Hirsch and Shotts (2008)).
Given elements of common values and dispersed information, legislators will generally
be able to use the information contained in the voting decisions of other members of
Congress to shape their own decision of how to vote. A natural question then emerges:
does bicameralism affect the voting behavior of members of Congress? And if so, what
are the implications for policy outcomes of adopting a bicameral legislature? This paper
addresses these questions by analyzing roll call voting data in the US Congress.
Doing so demands a fundamental change in the way we approach roll call voting
data. Beginning with the seminal contributions of Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991)
a large empirical literature made considerable progress in understanding the voting be-
havior of members of the US Congress.1 This progress relied on a fully micro-founded
(i.e., structural) approach, based on the sincere (non-strategic) spatial voting model of
decision-making in committees (SSV). In other words, these analysis take the SSV model
as given, and then recover the parameters of the model as those that best fit the data.2
While the SSV model has several appealing properties, it also makes strong implicit
and explicit assumptions which shape the analysis and interpretation of roll call data.
In particular, a key limitation of applying the SSV model to Congress is that it assumes
that the legislative setting is entirely about conflict resolution, precluding legislators from
considering the technical merit or appropriateness of proposals for the given state of the
environment. As a result, the SSV model rules out by hypothesis the possibility that
bicameralism can shape the quality of public policy.3
For the same reasons, the SSV model led to a disconnection in the analysis of voting
in the two chambers of Congress. In this private values model, a legislator votes in
favor of a proposal if and only if the proposal is closer to her ideal policy than the
status quo: the votes of other members do not contain information that would help a
legislator improve her decision. In particular, legislators in one chamber cannot gain
any relevant information by observing (or conditioning on) the outcome of the vote in
the other chamber. As a result, the empirical analysis of voting in Congress treated
the consideration of the same bill in the two separate chambers as statistically (and
theoretically) independent.
But with dispersed information about the quality of the proposal, a bicameral legisla-
ture can amount to more than a sequence of separate chambers. If at least some members
of the originating chamber use their information to guide their voting decision, the out-
come of their vote will become a public signal for members of the receiving chamber.
In fact, this is consistent with anecdotal evidence from comparable political institutions
with two-tier committee systems. In universities, for example, votes for tenured appoint-
ments with divided support in the faculty often fail at the administration level, or are not
even presented for consideration. A similar phenomenon seems to hold in committee-floor
considerations in legislatures.4 The model of common values and dispersed information
1Within this framework, the literature tackled a diverse array of issues, including stability and po-
larization in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal (1991), Poole and Rosenthal (1997), McCarty, Poole, and
Rosenthal (2001)), the role of Committees (Poole and Rosenthal (1997), Londregan and Snyder (1994)),
and the influence of political parties (Snyder and Groseclose (2000), McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
(2001), Cox and Poole (2002)).
2Different methodologies differ in what the meaning of best fit is; i.e., maximum likelihood, optimal
classification, or approximating the posterior distribution of the parameters in a Bayesian framework.
3The SSV can be extended to include a publicly known valence differential between alternatives. In
fact, as pointed out by Londregan (1999), the two models are equivalent: a valence advantage for the
proposal against the status quo is indistinguishilble from a more extreme status quo (and no valence).
Thus we cannot separately identify the midpoint between two alternatives and the valence differential.
Extending the spatial model to incorporate common values and dispersed information is a different
matter. This is the focus of this paper (see also Iaryczower and Shum (2009)).
4As Oleszek (2004) points out, bills “ voted out of committee unanimously stand a good chance on
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suggests that this is due to the fact that the voting outcome in the originating committee
aggregates information about the quality of the proposal vis-a-vis the status quo. A di-
vided vote in an academic committee is problematic because it sends the administration a
signal of low quality; similarly, a divided vote in a standing committee signals to the full
membership that the proposal might be a poor response for the current state of affairs.5
Does the two-tier committee system in Congress (bicameralism) lead to the same kind
of filtering of flawed proposals as in the above examples?
We begin by establishing some basic key facts about the impact of bicameralism on
legislative outcomes. To do this, we considered all bills that originated in the House,
and whose passage in the House was decided by a roll call vote in the 102nd to 109th
Congresses (1991-2006). For each of these bills, we then linked the votes of bills originated
in the House to their continuation in the Senate. With this new data we establish two
important facts. First, we show that a large number of bills approved by the House die
in the Senate. In particular, almost one quarter of all bills approved in the House reach
consideration on final passage in the Senate only after being heavily amended by that
body, and 45 percent of all bills passed by the House are never taken up for consideration
on final passage by the Senate. Second, we show that - as it appears to be the case in
standing committees and universities - proposals with a larger support in the originating
chamber tend to be more successful in the receiving chamber.
The correlation between voting outcomes does not necessarily rule out the SSV model:
any data with this property can be explained within the SSV model if the preferences
of members of both committees are properly aligned. It should be clear, however, that
the estimates of the SSV model that are consistent with the individual voting data will
not necessarily be consistent with the responsiveness of the outcome in the Senate to the
tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the House. In fact, we show that they are not:
the SSV model generates large errors in passage rates of the same bill across chambers.
We then characterize the equilibrium voting behavior in a theoretical framework that
is consistent with common values and dispersed information. In the model, a bicam-
eral legislature considers a proposal against the status quo. The proposal is considered
sequentially, first by the House and then (if it was approved by House) by the Senate,
and has to be approved by both chambers to be enacted into law. The proposal can
be of good or bad quality, and individuals only have imperfect private signals about its
quality. All individuals prefer a good proposal, but individuals differ in the amount of
evidence in favor of the proposal that would induce them to vote for it. We argue that
the data is consistent with a particular class of equilibria of the theoretical model in
which the Senate only approves House bills that were passed by the vote of more than
an (endogenous) R-majority of the members of the House that vote informatively.
the floor . . . [while a] sharply divided committee vote presages an equally sharp dispute on the floor”
(pg. 102).
5One might argue that it is not relevant whether the entire committee is divided, but instead whether
some particular subset of the membership tends to agree or be divided about the issue. This argument, as
we explain in more detail below, is not only correct but also consistent with our analysis, and simplified
here only for simplicity of exposition.
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We estimate the model within the Bayesian framework via MCMC methods. The
statistical model comprises two steps. In the first step, we implement a finite mixture
model to estimate legislators’ types and the proposal’s common value component in six
different policy areas. In this step we also estimate the precision of legislators’ private
information. In a second step, we estimate the equilibrium cutpoint in the Senate based
on the assignment of legislators into types in the first stage and on the realized vote
outcome for each bill that passed the House.
We show that the estimated cutpoint on informative votes can be mapped to an
endogenous supermajority rule (imposed on the House by the Senate) of about four-
fifths on average across areas. Together with a relatively high precision of the private
information of members of the House, this implies a highly conservative Senate, in the
sense that proposals are enacted into law only when the probability that the quality of
the proposal is high is very close to one. The results give credit to the genius of the
Founding Fathers in establishing the Senate as a counter-majoritarian device restraining
the impulse of “sudden and violent passions” that can prevail in the House (Hamilton,
Jay, and Madison (1788)).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the related
literature. Section 3 describes the main features of the data. In particular, Section 3.1
considers the implications of the SSV model for the passage or proposals across chambers.
Section 4 introduces the theoretical model and summarizes the empirical implications.
Section 5 presents the specification of the model, and the estimation methodology. Sec-
tion 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
On the substantive side, this paper is related to three main lines of research. First, the
paper builds on a rich literature on the consequences of bicameralism. This includes the
writings of Montesquieu (1748), and Hamilton, Jay, and Madison (1788), Dahl (1956),
Riker (1982), Lijphart (1984) Tsebelis (1995), Tsebelis and Money (1997), and Diermeier
and Myerson (1999) among many others.6 In particular, our paper falls within what
Tsebelis and Money (1997) call the efficiency rationale for bicameralism, emphasizing
the importance of common values in the legislative setting (see in particular Rogers
(1998, 2001)).
Different than previous accounts, however, our argument also emphasizes the im-
portance of dispersed information about the quality of proposals. As such, our paper
builds on the broad literature on strategic transmission of information from specialized
committees to the full chamber pioneered by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) and Krehbiel
6For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Tsebelis and Money (1997), Longley and Oleszek
(1989), Cutrone and McCarty (2006), and references therein.
4
(1991).7 Our approach differs from these in that it focuses on the strategic considera-
tions among members in (multimember) committees. Here we build on the literature
on strategic voting with common values and incomplete information in committees pio-
neered by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998).
Particularly relevant are the papers that tackled information transmission between two
bodies within this setting, as Piketty (2000), Maug and Yilmaz (2002), Razin (2003) and
finally Iaryczower (2008).
On the methodological side, our paper is related to the various efforts to analyze the
voting behavior of members of Congress starting from an underlying model of behav-
ior. The seminal paper here is Poole and Rosenthal (1985), where - starting from the
assumption that the data is generated according to the sincere voting spatial model -
Poole and Rosenthal develop NOMINATE, a method to estimate the parameters of the
spatial model (legislators’ ideal points and separating hyperplanes for each roll call).8
Londregan (1999) provides a sharp criticism of the empirical application of the agnostic
spatial model to legislatures. Londregan allows a (publicly known) valence advantage,
and proposes to incorporate features of the process of agenda formation to deal with the
incidental parameters problem present in the agnostic SSV (see also Londregan (2000),
Clinton and Meirowitz (2003), and Clinton and Meirowitz (2004)). Our paper joins these
efforts to incorporate strategic considerations into the analysis of voting in legislatures.
To our knowledge, our paper represents the first study to estimate a model of voting in
legislatures that allows for common values with dispersed information in an equilibrium
context (see also Iaryczower and Shum (2009)).
3 Bicameralism and Legislative Outcomes
In this section we describe the data and document how the sequential organization of the
U.S. Congress affects legislative outcomes. In Section 3.1 we use these data to evaluate
the performance of the SSV in terms of aggregate voting outcomes.
Our data consists of all bills that were originated in the House, and whose passage
in the House was decided by a roll call vote over the period 1991-2006 (Congresses 102
through 109). By bills, we refer loosely to both bills (say H.R. 100) and Joint Resolutions
7To be clear, in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987)’s theoretical framework legislators are uncertain about
the precise mapping from policy to outcomes. However, as Hirsch and Shotts (2008) point out, “many
of the examples of information and expertise in Krehbiel (1991) are better described by a model of
information as policy-specific valence than by the x = p + ω model.” See also Epstein and O’Halloran
(1999). Moreover, with risk averse legislators, and under some conditions, reducing the uncertainty
about the policy implications of a proposal is equivalent to improving its quality.
8See also Poole and Rosenthal (1991).Still based on the spatial model with sincere voting, Heckman
and Snyder (1997) and Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) propose alternatives estimation methods
to NOMINATE. Heckman and Snyder build on the random utility model with unobservable attributes
for the characteristics of the bill and the status quo. Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) develops a
Bayesian procedure for the estimation and inference of spatial models of roll call voting (see also Jackman
(2001)).
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(say H.J.Res.100) - which have the same effect as bills unless they are used to propose
amendments to the Constitution.9 We say that a bill was originated in the House if the
bill was voted on final passage in the House before being voted on final passage in the
Senate. We consider here only votes on final passage, thus ignoring votes on procedure
or amendments. Moreover, we consider only bills that passed the House by a roll call
vote, in which members’ votes are recorded individually, and that record made publicly
available prior to consideration of the bill in the Senate.10
Under the House rules, bills are considered for approval by a simple majority vote
of Representatives in a vote on passage (OP). Bills can also be approved in the House
by an alternative streamlined procedure, called suspend the rules and pass (SRP). In
a SRP vote, debate is restricted, amendments are not allowed, and the bill has to be
approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes. Our data consists of bills considered on
final passage either by a standard on passage vote, or by the SRP procedure. Between
1991 and 2006, 950 House bills had a roll call on passage, and 861 had a roll call vote on
SRP.11
To be considered approved by Congress, bills need to be passed in identical form by
the House and the Senate.12 Once a bill is passed by House, its fate in the Senate can
be classified in three categories. We consider that a bill passes (P ) if it is approved by
the Senate without any amendments during the same Congressional session in which it
is initiated in the House. An original bill is considered to be passed amended (A) if
it is approved by the Senate with amendments during the same Congressional session in
which it is initiated in the House. We also consider that a bill is passed amended if it fails
in the Senate by inaction, but a related bill (as classified by the Library of Congress, in
Thomas) that reached the chamber’s floor passed the Senate. Finally a bill fails (F ) if
it reaches the Senate floor and is voted down, or if it is never taken up for consideration.
The latter case occurs when: (a) no action whatsoever is taken in the Senate during the
Congress in which the House passed the bill; (b) a bill is never reported to the Floor by
the Senate committee to which it was referred; (c) the bill does not progress after being
placed on the Senate’s legislative calendar; or (d) the bill fails on a vote on cloture on the
9We do not include Concurrent resolutions (H. Con. Res. 100), nor House resolutions (H. Res. 100).
Concurrent resolutions have the force of both Houses and must be approved by them in identical form
to be effective, but do not need to be approved by the President, and do not become law. A House or
Senate resolution only has the force of the House passing it, and action by the one House is all that is
necessary.
10That is, we exclude voice votes and division votes. A roll call vote is used whenever a member
requests it, and that request is supported by at least twenty five members (By at least one-fifth of a
quorum of the House (44 Members), or by 25 Members in the Committee of the Whole).
11It is worth noting that “most” bills put up for a vote on final passage in the House do in fact pass
the House. Specifically, this amounted to more than 90 % of the 1811 votes on final passage in our
database.
12If the House and the Senate pass different versions of a bill, their disagreements are often resolved
through a conference committee, an ad hoc joint committee composed of delegations of both chambers.
Conferees usually draft a modified version of the bill in question, which is subsequently considered
sequentially under a closed rule by the House and the Senate. Our sample includes 237 bills that were
considered by the House for a final passage roll call vote after a conference committee.
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motion to proceed. Regardless of the particular way in which it takes place, Senatorial
inaction is akin to killing a bill.13 Figure 1 presents the fate of House bills in the Senate.
[Figure 1 about here]
The figure illustrates two key points. First, a fairly significant fraction of bills that
reach the Senate (38 percent) do get voted in the Senate as is. Moreover, once put up for
a vote, almost all of these bills in fact pass the vote in the Senate (only one in seventy
seven bills voted by roll call, and one in four hundred and thirty two bills voted by voice
vote failed to pass). However, being up for consideration in the Senate was hardly a
synonym of success. In fact, a staggering 37 percent (718) of the House bills that reached
the Senate were not taken up for consideration on final passage: 75 were ignored, 481
never made it out of committee, 200 were reported out of committee and put on calendar
but were never voted, and 10 failed a vote to pass a filibuster. In addition, almost a
quarter of the bills (475) only reached consideration for final passage after being heavily
amended by the body. Thus, a second fact is that - even before considering amendments
- a large number of bills that passed the House die in the Senate. It follows that if
legislators are outcome oriented and strategic, analyzing voting outcomes independently
across chambers, without linking votes and outcomes to its continuation in the receiving
chamber, can be problematic.
The figure has two additional implications. First, the selection of bills into OP or SRP
considerations is not random or innocuous. Pieces of legislation that were approved in
the House using the SRP procedure (and thus received the support of at least two-thirds
of its members) were more likely to be approved without amendments by the Senate than
bills approved by a simple majority (OP). The opposite is true with regard to those bills
that were approved after being heavily amended in the Senate. House bills that were
approved in the House using simple majority (OP) are more likely to be approved with
amendments by the Senate than bills approved using a SRP procedure. Note also that
bills approved in the House using simple majority (OP) are more likely to fail than those
passed under SRP.
Second, the figure also suggests that after a bill is voted by the two chambers, and
a compromise is reached within the conference committee, all private information is
made public, and there is no aggregate uncertainty. In fact, there is almost no variation
in outcomes after a bill is reported from the conference committee: approximately 95
13HR 1236, the National Flood Insurance, Mitigation, and Erosion Management Act of 1991, is a case
in point. The bill was passed in the House, referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, and failed
to progress from then on. In the Congressional record of October 8, 1992, Senator Kerry says: “Mr.
President, it is with deep regret that today I inform my colleagues that the 102nd Congress will adjourn
sine die without passage of flood insurance reform legislation. The tremendous need for flood insurance
reform is plainly evident. Yet we have failed to act and, in our inaction, have acted contrary to common
sense and incontrovertible evidence. . . . here we are at the end of the 102nd Congress and it is evident
that there will be no flood insurance reform in this Congress. Despite the efforts at compromise, despite
good faith negotiations with my colleagues, despite compelling evidence supporting reform, we could not
reach an agreement, and I am sincerely disappointed by this outcome.”
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percent of these bills (225) were passed (without amendments) once they reached the
Senate. We henceforth exclude these bills from our analyses.
Support for the Bill in the House: Does it Matter? As we mentioned in the
introduction, a stylized fact from two-tier committee systems in various political institu-
tions is that proposals that pass the originating committee without significant objections
tend to be more successful in the receiving committee than those proposals that clear the
first committee with a contested vote. Does the two-tier committee system in Congress
(bicameralism) lead to similar outcomes?
To tackle this question, we begin by considering whether the outcome of the bill in
the Senate is “correlated” with the fraction of members of the House supporting the bill.
To measure this aggregate support, we compute the net tally of votes in favor of the
proposal in the House (number of “aye” votes minus number of “nay” votes) for each
bill in the sample. The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the distribution (kernel density
estimates) of the net tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the House conditional on
two possible outcomes in the Senate: the bill passes (P ) and the bill fails (F ).
[Figure 2 about here]
The figure show a significant difference in the Pass and Fail conditional distributions,
especially for bills considered On Passage. The distribution of the tally in the House
conditional on a Senate Fail (a Senate Pass) puts a relatively large probability mass on
low (high) values of the tally. In other words, bills that are approved by the Senate tend
to have higher tallies in the House than bills that fail in the Senate.14
The same conclusion holds if we separate bills by different policy areas. To do this, we
use the committee/s to which the bill was referred to classify each roll call as pertaining to
one of six policy areas: Appropriations, Foreign Relations, Economic Activity, Judiciary,
Government Operations, and Others.15 The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the “Senate
Fail” and “Senate Pass” conditional distributions of the net tally of votes in favor of the
proposal in the House for votes On Passage in Appropriations and Judiciary. Once again,
the evidence indicates that pieces of legislation that were approved in the House with a
14In fact, we can say more. Bills that passed the Senate typically have higher tallies in the House
than bills that pass amended in the Senate, and these in turn have higher tallies than bills that fail in
the Senate.
15We obtained the basic referral information from the Library of Congress, in Thomas. We classify
a bill in “Appropriations” if it was referred to the Appropriations committee, and to “Other” if it was
referred to multiple committees. If a bill was referred to a single committee other than appropriations,
we classify it in one of the remaining four classes: Foreign Relations (includes Foreign Affairs, Armed
Services, National Security, Veterans’ Affairs, Homeland Security and Intelligence), Economic Activity
(includes Agriculture, Science, Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Natural
Resources, Small Business, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries),
Judiciary (includes Judiciary), and Government Operations (includes Budget, Government Reform, and
Ways and Means).
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larger net number of favorable votes are more likely to be approved by the Senate than
bills approved with less legislative support.
3.1 The Sincere Voting Spatial Model in Bicameral Perspective
The findings in the previous section are consistent with, but do not necessarily imply,
that the tally of votes in the House is transmitting relevant information to members of the
Senate. In particular, the correlation between the tally of favorable votes in the House
and the outcomes in the Senate could also be consistent with the sincere voting spatial
model. If the preferences of members of both houses are highly correlated, then proposals
that only receive the support of a small number of House members should also receive the
support of a small number of Senators, while proposals that are overwhelmingly preferred
to the status quo in the House should also be preferred to the status quo by a winning
coalition in the Senate.
It should be clear, however, that the estimates of the SSV model that are consistent
with the individual voting data will not necessarily be consistent with the responsiveness
of the outcome in the Senate to the tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the House.
For example, if preferences are perfectly aligned across chambers and both committees
decide by simple majority rule, then all proposals that clear the first committee will clear
the second committee as well. This, however, would be inconsistent with the passage
rates described in the previous section. As a result, while not necessarily ruling out the
SSV model, the correlation in voting outcomes suggest that the match between the data
and the model should be reconsidered.
In this section we evaluate this alternative hypothesis using Poole and Rosenthal’s
Optimal Classification (OC) common-space estimates. OC is a non-parametric scaling
method that maximizes the number of correctly classified choices (individual votes),
assuming that legislators have symmetric single-peaked preferences in an underlying Eu-
clidean policy space, and vote sincerely. In the common-space procedure, OC is used to
simultaneously scale every session of both houses of Congress, using legislators who served
in both chambers to place the House and Senate in the same space. Hence, the estimates
of the ideal points/roll call cutpoints are directly comparable across both chambers.
The sincere-voting spatial model is characterized by two sets of parameters. The
first is the set of legislators’ ideal points in the House and the Senate. Second, for each
roll call, there is an associated separating line L, that partitions the space into two half
spaces. Legislators with ideal points to either side of L are predicted to vote “aye” and
“nay”, respectively. The basic idea is to use the separating line estimated for each roll
call in the House, together with the estimates of the ideal points of Senators to obtain a
predicted outcome in the Senate. Having done this, we can then compare the predicted
and actual outcomes in the Senate.16
16Specifically, we proceed as follows. We take Keith Poole’s OC estimates for the spatial voting model
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Figure 3 presents the comparison between the predicted outcomes generated using
the OC estimates and the actual Senate outcomes. The top (bottom) panel shows the
results assuming that a simple (three-fifths) majority rule is used to determine a bill’s
passage in the Senate.
[Figure 3 about here]
The evidence in Figure 3 clearly indicates that the standard (private-values) spatial
model with sincere voting generates predictions that are at odds with the data. Consider,
for example, the 106th Congress’ predictions assuming that a simple majority voting
rule is used. According to the sincere voting spatial model, 156 bills should have been
approved by the Senate (and only 1 should have failed). Instead, 43 were approved
after being heavily amended, and 68 actually failed. A similar pattern holds for the
other sessions of Congress. The predicted power of the spatial model improves if we
assume that a three-fifths majority decision rule is employed. Nonetheless, as Figure 3
demonstrates, the spatial model still generates large errors when it is used to predict
bills’ passage rates across chambers.
4 The Model
The analysis of the previous section suggests that the standard spatial model with sincere
voting generates large errors in passage rates of the same bill across chambers. In this
section, we develop the implications of a theoretical framework that is consistent with
common values and dispersed information. We consider here the model of strategic voting
with common value components introduced in Iaryczower (2008). The model develops
formally a simple intuition: if committee members have private information about the
as given (these estimates are publicly available at http://voteview.com/oc.htm). The set of estimates
includes the following elements: for each legislator, (i) his/her ideal point; and for each roll call of a bill
originated in the House, (ii) the normal vector N = (n1, n2) (perpendicular to L), (iii) the projected
midpoint on the normal vector, `, and (iv) the polarity (where the “ayes” and “nays” fell relative to the
projected midpoint on the normal vector). Points on the normal vector N = (n1, n2) are points (x1, x2)
such that x2 = x1 n2n1 . A line perpendicular to N (parallel to L) passing through the point z = (z1, z2) -
call it L(z1, z2) - is then given by
L(z1, z2) ≡ {(x1, x2) : n1(z1 − x1) + (z2 − x2)n2 = 0}
Thus the projection onto N of an ideal point (z1, z2) is given by the intersection of N and L(z1, z2),
(zˆ1, zˆ2) =
(
n1
n21 + n
2
2
(n1z1 + n2z2),
n2
n21 + n
2
2
(n1z1 + n2z2)
)
, and its relative location on the normal vector is then given by d(zˆ, 0) × sign(zˆ1 × n1). Using the
projected midpoint on the normal vector for a given roll call, `, and its polarity, a predicted vote for
each Senator for each (scaled) roll call in our sample can be obtained. Finally, using these predictions,
we can calculate for each bill originated in the House, a predicted (counterfactual) pass/fail outcome in
the Senate.
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relative value of the alternatives under consideration, voting outcomes can aggregate
and transmit relevant information to members of the receiving committee. The model
builds on the seminal contributions of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), and Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998). Here, however, voting does not occur in single-committee
systems, but instead a proposal can prevail only by defeating the status quo by (possibly
qualified) majority voting first in one and, provided it is successful there, then in a second
committee.17
A group of individuals arranged in two committees, C0 and C1, choose between a
proposal A and a status quo Q, both lying in an arbitrary policy space X. Committee
Cj is populated by an odd number nj of individuals, and the collective choice of each
committee j is determined by voting under a Rj-majority rule without abstention. For-
mally, letting vi ∈ {−1, 1} denote i’s vote against (−1) or in favor (1) of the proposal,
t(vj) ≡
∑
i∈Cj vi the net tally of votes in favor of the proposal in Cj, and zj ∈ {Q,A}
the policy choice in Cj, zj = A if and only if t(vj) ≥ rj, for an odd integer rj such that
1 ≤ rj ≤ nj (thus Rj = nj+rj2 ).
Voting is simultaneous within each committee, but sequential between committees.18
The alternatives are first voted on in the originating committee C0, or the House. If the
proposal defeats the status quo in the originating committee, the alternatives are then
voted on in the receiving committee C1, or the Senate. The proposal is adopted if and
only if it defeats the status quo in both committees, tj(vj) ≥ rj for j = 0, 1, otherwise
the status quo remains.
The proposal can be of high or low quality, and this is unobservable. We represent this
state by an unobservable random variable ω ∈ {ωA, ωQ}, where ωA denotes high quality.
We denote the prior probability of the proposal being of high quality by Pr(ω = ωA) = p.
Each individual i ∈ Cj receives a private, imperfectly informative signal si ∈ {−1, 1},
distributed independently conditional on the quality of the proposal, such that Pr(si =
1|ωA) = Pr(si = −1|ωQ) = q > 1/2.
Individuals’ preferences have an ideological and a common value component. Each
individual i ∈ Cj has a publicly known ideology bias either for or against the proposal, and
we say that i is either a liberal or a conservative, respectively. Liberals and conservatives
differ in their ranking of alternatives conditional on observing the same information I. In
particular, liberals prefer the proposal to the status quo whenever Pr(ωA|I) ≥ piA for some
17The possibility of observing the outcome of the vote in the originating committee introduces two main
differences in the incentives of members of both committees vis a vis the single-committtee framework.
First, the tally of the votes in favor of the alternative becomes an informative public signal for members of
the receiving committee, and therefore members of the receiving committee can condition their behavior
on the voting outcome in the originating committee. Second, members of the originating committee can
influence the outcome both in the traditional sense of killing or passing the proposal in their committee (a
standard-pivotal voting motive), and/or by influencing the beliefs of members of the receiving committee
regarding the relative value of the two alternatives (a signal-pivotal voting motive).
18It should be noted however that the equilibrium of Proposition 1 remains an equilibrium if voting
within each chamber is done sequentially.
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piA < 1/2, while conservatives prefer the proposal to the status quo whenever Pr(ωA|I) ≥
piQ for some piQ > 1/2. More formally, we normalize the payoff for both types if the
proposal is not passed to zero, and denote the payoff of an individual of type b ∈ {Q,A}
if the proposal passes in state ω by Uωb , with U
A
b = 1−pib > 0 and UQb = −pib < 0. Thus the
individual wants the proposal passed given I if Pr(ωA|I)[1−pib] + [1−Pr(ωA|I)](−pib) ≥
0 ⇔ Pr(ωA|I) ≥ pib. The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure
strategies, with a refinement: with probability 1−υ, a committee member i is a moderate,
and has the preferences described above; with probability υ > 0, she is a partisan and
always votes her bias. We focus on equilibria of the game for small υ.
The model admits two classes of voting equilibria in which the tally of votes in favor
of the proposal in the originating committee transmits relevant information to members
of the receiving committee, two-sided informative (TSI) voting equilibria and endogenous
majority rule (EMR) voting equilibria. It also admits a third class of equilibria in which
only members of the receiving committee vote informatively (see Iaryczower (2008) for
more details).
Of these three classes of possible equilibrium behavior, however, only EMR voting
equilibria are consistent with the bicameral data. In two-sided informative (TSI) voting,
members of both committees vote informatively. In particular, in any equilibrium of this
class the probability of the proposal being accepted increases (strictly) with the tally of
votes in favor of the proposal in the originating committee. To achieve this, the number of
individuals voting informatively in the receiving committee must vary following different
vote tallies in the originating committee. Implicit in the construction of equilibria of this
kind is therefore the requirement that the proposal can fail and succeed on a vote in the
receiving committee with positive probability. This is, however, inconsistent with the
bicameral data, for which proposals are killed in Committee or scheduling, but not on
votes on the floor. The same argument rules out equilibria in which only members of the
receiving committee votes informatively.
The remaining equilibria are endogenous majority rule (EMR) voting equilibria. In
an EMR voting equilibrium, the second committee acts only to raise the hurdle that
the alternative has to surpass in the first committee to defeat the status quo, killing
the proposal following sufficiently low vote tallies in the originating committee, and
unconditionally approving the proposal otherwise.
In order to characterize EMR equilibria, it will be convenient to measure agents’
biases in terms of the least net number of positive (negative) signals that a conservative
(liberal) member would need to observe to vote for (against) the proposal. We call
these signal thresholds ρQ (for conservatives) and ρA (for liberals). Note that given
information I, an individual with bias pi prefers the proposal to the status quo if and
only if Pr(I|ωA)
Pr(I|ωQ) ≥ pi1−pi
1−p
p
. Note moreover that
Pr(s:
P
i si=τ |ωA)
Pr(s:
P
i si=τ |ωQ) =
(
q
1−q
)τ
. Thus, focusing
on ρQ for example,
ρQ ≡ min
{
τ :
(
q
1− q
)τ
≥ pi
1− pi
1− p
p
}
(1)
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The following proposition fully characterizes EMR voting equilibria.
Proposition 1 (1) If conservatives can block the proposal in the receiving committee,
there exists an EMR voting equilibrium if and only if the number of conservative
members in the originating committee is at least ρQ. In an equilibrium of this class,
ρQ ≤ k ≤ min{nQ0 , ρQ+n0−(r0−1)} conservatives in the House vote informatively,
and the Senate passes the bill if and only if the net tally of votes of individuals voting
informatively is above ρQ.
(2) If conservatives cannot block the proposal in the receiving committee, then there
exists an EMR voting equilibrium if and only if the majority surplus of liberals in
the originating committee,
nA0 −nQ0 −r0
2
is at least ρA. In an equilibrium of this class,
ρA ≤ k ≤ nA0 − nQ0 − r0 − ρA liberals vote informatively in the House and the
proposal fails in the Senate if and only if the net tally of votes of individuals voting
informatively in the house is below −ρA.
Note that in an EMR voting equilibrium the likelihood of the proposal defeating the
status quo in the receiving committee is a step function of the vote tally in the originating
committee (as opposed to a strictly increasing function, as in a TSI voting equilibrium). It
should be noted that in a EMR voting equilibrium it is common knowledge for members of
the receiving committee whether the proposal will pass the senate or not after observing
the outcome of the vote in the house. Thus while passing the proposal requires its
approval in a vote on the floor, it is immaterial whether the proposal is killed in a vote,
by scheduling, or by burying it in a Committee. Proposition 1 provides the theoretical
foundations of the econometric specification that we describe in the next section.
5 Estimation
5.1 Econometric Specification
In EMR voting equilibria, only members of the originating committee vote informatively,
the second committee acts only to raise the hurdle that the alternative has to surpass
in the first committee to defeat the status quo in equilibrium. As a result, the votes
of individual members of the receiving committee (the Senate) do not provide relevant
information for the outside observer (the econometrician). In the originating committee
instead (the House), all votes contain useful information to recover the structure of the
model: (i) the prior probability of the quality of the proposal being high, (ii) the type of
each individual, and (iii) the precision of their private information. The data therefore
consists of an n × T matrix v of voting data in the House (the originating committee),
and a 1 × (T − TF ) vector z of outcomes of House bills in the Senate. Here T is the
number of votes in which the House is the originating committee, TF is the number of
votes in the House in which the proposal failed in the House, and n is the number of
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legislators in the house. Column t is therefore the voting record for all legislators in the
house in roll call t, vt, with ith entry vit ∈ {−1, 1, ∅}.
To control for the effect that the heterogeneity in policy areas might have on equilib-
rium behavior, we will allow preferences, information technology and equilibrium strate-
gies to vary between policy issues. In particular, we will assume that the prior probability
of the state being favorable for the proposal, the precision of private information and the
voting strategy of each individual are invariant within issues but can differ between issues.
Let α denote the assignment of roll calls t = 1, . . . , T to classes g = 1, . . . , G according
to the classification in issue areas of Section 3.
Within each class g, therefore, the preferences and voting strategy of each member
of the House are fixed, and can be summarized by a type θig ∈ {Y, I,N}. Here θig =
Y denotes i is a partisan-liberal in class g, who supports proposals independently of
her private information. Similarly, θig = N means i opposes the proposals in class g
independently of her private information (i is a partisan-conservative). Finally, θig = I
if i votes informatively in class g, supporting the proposal when si = 1 but voting
against it when si = −1. The type of an individual i is therefore a 1 × G vector θi ≡
(θi1, . . . , θiG). The precision of signals is also allowed to vary per class, so that q ≡
(q1, . . . , qG). The common prior of the state being favorable to the proposal is also issue-
specific. Given independence of states between roll calls, which we assume throughout,
then Pr(ωt = ωA) = pα(t), and p ≡ (p1, . . . , pG). For each class g there is also an EMR
voting equilibrium cutpoint ζg in the Senate. The vector of Senate equilibrium cutpoints
is then ζ ≡ (ζ1, . . . , ζG). Finally, we assume that there is a probability of error µ at the
individual level, so that whenever equilibrium behavior dictates a vote v ∈ {−1, 1}, the
observed value is v with probability 1−µ and −v with probability µ. We can then write
down an expression for the likelihood of data y = (v, z) given (q, p, θ, ζ). First,
Pr(y|q, p, θ, ζ) =
G∏
g=1
∏
t:α(t)=g
Pr(yt|pg, qg, θg, ζg), (2)
Next, given α(t) = g, since the outcome in the Senate depends only on the relevant
cutpoint ζg and on the informative tally, itself a function only of vt and θg, then
Pr(yt|pg, qg, θg, ζg) = Pr(vt|pg, qg, θg) Pr(zt|vt, θg, ζg)
Next we obtain an expression for Pr(vt|pg, qg, θg). For a = N, I, Y , let ma(t, g) ≡
|{i ∈ C1 : θi = a, vit = 1}| and `a(t, g) ≡ |{i ∈ C1 : θi = a, vit = −1}| denote the number
of individuals of type a in group g voting in favor and against the bill, respectively. Now,
let κg ≡ [qg(1 − µ) + (1 − qg)µ] denote the probability that an individual i such that
θig = I votes in favor (against) of the proposal in roll call t if ωt = 1 (if ωt = 0). Then
Pr({vit}i:θig=I |qg, pg) =
[
pgκ
mI(t,g)
g (1− κg)`I(t,g) + (1− pg)(1− κg)mI(t,g)κ`I(t,g)g
]
.
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Moreover, since Pr(vit = 1|θig = N) = µ, and Pr(vit = 1|θig = Y ) = 1 − µ, then
Pr({vit}i:θig=N) = µmN (t,g)(1−µ)`N (t,g) and Pr({vit}i:θig=Y ) = (1−µ)mY (t,g)µ`Y (t,g), so that
Pr(vt|qg, pg, θg) = µmN (t,g)(1− µ)`N (t,g) × (1− µ)mY (t,g)µ`Y (t,g)
× [pgκmI(t,g)g (1− κg)`I(t,g) + (1− pg)(1− κg)mI(t,g)κ`I(t,g)g ] . (3)
Consider now Pr(zt|vt, θg, ζg). Assume first that in the data we observe a binary
Pass/Fail outcome in the Senate zt ∈ {0, 1}, as it is in the theory. Let τt(g, vt) ≡∑
i:θig=I
vi denote the informative tally in roll call t. We introduce noise εt in the class
g cutpoint ζg so that zt = 1 if and only if τt(g, vt) ≥ ζg + t, or equivalently if εt ≤
τt(g, vt)− ζg. Assuming that t is i.i.d. with c.d.f. F (·), then (again, for α(t) = g)
Pr(zt|vt, θg, ζg) = [F (τt(g, vt)− ζg)]zt [1− F (τt(g, vt)− ζg)]1−zt
In the data, however, we observe not two but three outcomes in the Senate: bills that
Fail, bills that Pass without being amended, and bills that Pass after being amended in
the Senate. We proceed as follows. We assume that bills either Pass or Fail, but that this
final outcome zt ∈ {0, 1} is unobservable. What we observe is an imperfect signal of this
final outcome, zˆ ∈ {P,A, F}. In particular, we assume that Pr(zˆt = A|zt = 0) = 1 − η,
Pr(zˆt = F |zt = 0) = η, Pr(zˆt = A|zt = 1) = 1 − γ, and Pr(zˆt = P |zt = 0) = γ. Given
these we have:
Pr(zˆt|τt(g, vt), ζg) = [γF (τt(g, vt)− ζg)]I(zˆt=P ) × [η(1− F (τt(g, vt)− ζg))]I(zˆt=F )
× [(1− γ)F (τt(g, vt)− ζg) + (1− η)(1− F (τt(g, vt)− ζg))]I(zˆt=A).
(4)
5.2 Estimation Methodology
To estimate the model, we adopt a Bayesian approach. In this setting, the objects
of analysis are the distributions of the parameters (q, p, ζ, {θi}). We follow a two-step
estimation procedure. In the first step, we use the observed votes of each legislator in
each issue class g to estimate class-specific posterior distributions of the signal precision
qg, the assignment of legislators into types θi,g ∈ {N, I, Y }, and the assignment of roll
calls t into the set of possible realizations of the unobservable state {ωQ, ωA}. In the
second step, we compute the average informative tally for each bill in class g based on
the a posteriori assignment of legislators into types, and estimate the EMR equilibrium
cutpoint ζg. Both steps rely on Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods (Gilks,
Richardson, and Spiegelhalter (1996), Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004)).19
19It is in fact possible to integrate both steps in a single estimation procedure. Given the complexity
of the problem, however, the computational burden of a single-step estimation approach renders it very
impractical for dealing with multiple large datasets, as in our case. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning
that, using small simulated datasets, we found little difference in the main substantive conclusions drawn
from models estimated under the two procedures.
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First Stage. The main idea underlying the estimation of the model is that the vote
of legislator i in a roll call t depends only on her type θi and the realization of the state
ωt (we drop for convenience the dependence on the issue class g when there is no room
for confusion). From (2) and (3), estimating q would be straightforward if we knew the
type of each legislator and the realization of the state in each roll call. The problem of
course is that θ and ω are not observable. To address this complication, the first step of
our estimation strategy implements a latent class or finite mixture model.
Latent class analysis is useful to explain heterogeneity in observed categorical vari-
ables (e.g., votes) in terms of a small number of underlying latent classes or groups (e.g.,
legislators’ types and state realizations). The observations in the sample are assumed
to arise from mutually exclusive classes characterized by intra-group homogeneity and
inter-group differences in behavioral or attitudinal patterns, with the association between
the observed indicators assumed to be entirely explained by their relationship to a latent
categorical variable (see for example McLachlan and Peel (2000)).20 In our model, these
latent variables are the types θ and the state ω. We then adopt an ex post specifica-
tion for the state, where the state parameter is given by ω (as opposed to p in an ex
ante formulation). Since ωt is independent across t, we can then estimate p from the
hyperparameter describing the distribution of ωt (more on this below).
Compared to similar latent trait models and to traditional cluster, factor and dis-
criminant analysis techniques, latent class models provide a clearer and more robust way
of summarizing patterns of categorical responses while imposing less restrictive distribu-
tional assumptions (Hagenaars and Halman (1989), Huang and Bandeen Roche (2004)).
As a result, they have recently found a growing number of uses in political science (Blay-
des and Linzer (2008), Jackman (2008), Treier and Jackman (2008)). Virtually all appli-
cations in the political science literature, though, assume a single relevant classification
dimension.
In our setting, however, we need to classify both legislators into types and rollcalls
into states. To implement this, we draw on recent developments on two-sided clustering
methods used in collaborative filtering (Ungar and Foster (1998), Hoffman and Puzicha
(1999)), implementing a fully Bayesian approach based on the Gibbs sampling algorithm
(Gelfland and Smith (1990), Diebolt and Robert (1994)) that allows for the (probabilis-
tic) classification of legislators into types and rollcalls into states while simultaneously
estimating q.21 The unknown types and states are treated as random variables with
20In general, the optimal number of classes is not directly estimated from the model, but empirically
determined by comparing successive models with an increasing number of latent groups to find the most
parsimonious model that provides an adequate fit to the data (Reboussin, Ip, and Wolfson (2008)). In
our paper, however, the number of groups - i.e., the types of legislators and states of the world - is a
priori determined based on the theoretical model.
21Although the most widely used approach to fitting finite mixture or latent class models is the
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm and its extensions (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977),
McLachlan and Krishnan (1997)), the standard EM algorithm cannot be efficiently formulated for this
problem, since untractably many sufficient statistics are required for the EM formulation (Ungar and
Foster (1998)). Alternative approaches for parameter estimation in this context, such as, variational
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missing values, which in the Bayesian framework are essentially indistinguishible from
other model parameters. Inference thus requires defining a prior for the indicators of
type/state and the remaining model parameters and sampling from their joint posterior
distribution.
Specifically, we proceed as follows. First, we specify a prior distribution for the
parameters θ, ω, q.22 In particular, we assume that (i) q ∼ U [1/2, 1], that (ii) for each
i ∈ N , Pr(θi = j) = λj for j = N, I, Y , and that (iii) for each roll call t ∈ T , Pr(ωt =
ωA) = p. We give the hyperparameters λj and p diffuse prior distributions fλ and fp.
We can then write a joint posterior distribution for the vector (θ, ω, q;λ, p),
f(θ, ω, q;λ, p|v) ∝ Pr(v|θ, ω, q)f(θ, ω, q|λ, p)fλ(λ)fp(p)
Note that given {θi} and {ωt}, the mixture model essentially reduces to a standard
binary choice model, and it is thus quite straightforward to sample from the conditional
distribution of the remaining parameters. Hence, the sampling algorithm implemented
alternates two major steps (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004)): (i) obtaining
draws from the distribution of θi and ωt given p, λ, and q; and (ii) obtaining draws
from q and the hyperparameters p, λ given the type/state realizations. This leads to
an iterative scheme whereby, starting from an arbitrary set of initial values, we obtain
a sample of the parameters ψm = (pm, λm, qm, θm, ωm) for each step m of the sampling
algorithm, m = 1, . . . ,M . Under mild regularity conditions, the sampled parameters
ψm asymptotically satisfy ψm ∼ P (ψ|vg) (Gilks, Richardson, and Spiegelhalter (1996),
Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004)).23
Given the convergent samples of types θ, we assign each legislator to a type and
each rollcall to a state based on their maximum a-posteriori probabilities (MAP). Given
this assignment, we compute the net informative tally τt(vt) ≡
∑
i:θi=I
vi for all bills
methods and blocked Gibbs sampling, have been proposed by researchers working in the field of collab-
orative filtering - see Hoffman and Puzicha (1999).
22Note that this treats the voting error µ as given. In the results that we report in Section 6, we fix this
at µ = 0.10. All major conclusions remain unchanged if we set µ = 0.05. Moreover, we also repeated the
analysis including µ as an additional parameter to be estimated with the remaining parameters of the
model. Again, the results are fundamentally unchanged. Furthermore, the estimated µ ranges between
values of 0.10 and 0.15 in all policy areas. These results are reproduced in Figures 7, 8 and 9 in the
Appendix.
23A well known difficulty with MCMC estimation of posterior distributions in latent class models is
the “label switching” problem stemming from the fact that permutations of the class assignments are
not necessarily identifiable since the likelihood may be unchanged under these permutations (Redner
and Walker (1984)). Label switching is less of an issue in our model, given the constraints on the proba-
bilities of voting in favor of a bill for the different types of legislators derived from the theoretical model
(Diebolt and Robert (1994)). In fact, visual inspection of the MCMC chains showed no evidence of la-
bel switching. Nonetheless, to avoid potential problems, we used the decision-theoretic post-processing
approach described by Stephens (2000) to “untangle” the class assignments, considering all the possible
permutations of class assignments at each iteration of the sampling algorithm and choosing the permu-
tation that maximized the posterior probability that the labeling of types and states was consistent with
the previous assignment.
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that passed the House. Together with the outcome of the bill in the Senate, the net
informative tallies computed in this way become the data in the second stage.
Second Stage. In the second step of the procedure, we estimated the EMR equilibrium
cutpoints ζg for g = 1, . . . , G. Consistent with (4), we assumed that the observed out-
comes zˆt are conditionally distributed zˆt∼Multinomial(1, ϕt), with ϕt = (ϕPt , ϕAt , ϕFt )′
and, for j = P,A, F :
ϕjt = γjP (zt = 1|τt(g, vt), ζg) + ηjP (zt = 0|τt(g, vt), ζg) (5)
P
(
zt = 1|τt(g, vt), ζg
)
= Φ
(
τt(g, vt)− ζg
)
(6)
where γF = ηP = 0, γA = 1−γP , ηA = 1−ηF , and where Φ is the cdf of a standard normal
variable. Given the relatively small number of rollcalls assigned to some of the classes,
we used a hierarchical specification to “borrow strength” across them (Gelman, Carlin,
Stern, and Rubin (2004), Gelman and Hill (2007)), assigning a N(µζ , σζ) distribution to
ζg, g = 1, . . . , G.
For each step of the estimation procedure, three parallel chains with dispersed initial
values and varying lengths were run after an initial burn-in period, with convergence as-
sessed based on Gelman and Rubin’s potential scale reduction factors R̂ (Gelman and Ru-
bin (1992)). We used independent priors for the parameters in ψ: we assumed that λ has
a uniform Dirichlet distribution, that p ∼ U [0, 1], and that q ∼ U [1/2, 1]. For the param-
eters of the second stage, we assumed µςg ∼ N (0, 100), σςg ∼ InverseGamma(0.1, 0.1),
γ, η ∼ Dirichlet(1, 1).
Routine sensitivity checks were performed to assess the robustness of the estimates to
the prior distributions. In all cases, the average overlap the between prior and posterior
distribution for the parameters governing the latent class membership probabilities was
quite small, and the (empirical) Kullback-Leibler divergences were extremely high. This
indicates that there is enough data to distinguish between the different types and states.
This suggests that the model is well identified, and thus relatively insensitive to prior
assumptions (Garrett and Zeger (2000), Elliot, Gallo, Ten, Bogner, and Katz (2005)).
Posterior predictive simulations based on the subject-level statistic S =
∑
t vi,t indicated
that the (conditionally) independent Bernoulli distribution for legislators’ votes is rea-
sonable (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004)). The posterior predictive p-value∑
rep I
(∑
t v
rep
i,t >
∑
t vi,t
)
/
∑
rep I based on 1,000 replications ranged between 0.13 to
0.82 across legislators. In addition, in order to check the ability of our estimation strat-
egy to recover the “true” model parameters and class memberships, we used “fake-data
simulations” (Gelman and Hill (2007)) with several alternative datasets. Classifying leg-
islators and rollcalls acording to the MAP led to very high rates of success in terms of
agreement between actual and estimated class membership, and the central 95% credible
intervals for the parameters of interest covered in all cases the true values, with point
estimates reasonably close to them.24
24Details from different simulation exercises and robustness checks are available from the authors upon
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6 Results
In this section, we present the main results. For presentation purposes, we focus here on
the results for non-unanimous votes On Passage. (Figure 5 in the Appendix summarizes
the results for SRP votes.)25 The main results are summarized in Figure 4
[Figure 4 about here]
The top left panel presents the estimate of the signal precision qg ≡ Pr(sit = ωt|ωt, α(t) =
g) for state ωt ∈ {−1, 1} and issue g = 1, . . . , G. The chart presents the median value,
and the 5 and 95 percentiles of (a sample of 1000 observations drawn from) the posterior
distribution of the parameters of the model. Note that the estimates in all issue areas
are very precise, as 90 percent of the mass of the posterior is concentrated in a small
interval around the median (0.911 - 0.921 for Appropriations, 0.949 - 0.959 for Economic
issues, etc). In terms of the value of the estimates, note that the precision of the signals
is relatively large, close to 0.9 in all issue areas. This suggests that private information
- information dispersed in the system that has not been made public and incorporated
in the prior - is quite important. The moderate heterogeneity across issue areas suggests
that this conclusion holds independently of issue class, at least within our relatively broad
issue classification.
The top right panel presents the estimate of the common prior probability that the
proposal is of high quality, pg ≡ Pr(ωt = 1|α(t) = g). To calculate this, we first compute
for each point in the sample the proportion of roll calls with ωt = 1. We then compute the
median and 5-95 percentiles of this variable in the sample. The results suggest relatively
moderate beliefs about the quality or appropriateness of proposals being brought to a
vote in the House (possibly with the exception of the more favorable expectations in
Foreign Relations).26 This is consistent with our previous finding in terms of the value
of private information in the system.
The middle panels show the proportion of members of the House voting informatively
(left) and the proportion of members of the House voting uninformatively in favor of the
proposal (right). Recall that each point in the sample from the posterior distribution
includes a type for each legislator. Thus for each point in the sample we can compute the
proportion of legislators of each type. The chart presents the median, and 5-95 percentiles
of this variable in the sample. The results show that, according to our estimates, a large
fraction of the House votes according to their private information in each case. With the
exception of Foreign Relations, the proportion of legislators voting informatively ranges
request.
25While there are interesting differences in the details between these and bills considered On Passage,
the main results remain unchanged.
26A possible interpretation of this result is that there is a “rally around the flag” effect: when legislators
face issues regarding national security rather than domestic/distributional issues, they tend to hold more
favorable views with respect to the appropriateness of the proposal.
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from a relatively low 40% in the case of Appropriations bills, to a 50% in Judiciary
bills. In Foreign Relations the proportion is higher still: about 70% of the total members
vote informatively. That this is large relative to the EMR cutpoint (lower left panel)
means that the public signal generated by the informative tally of votes in favor of the
proposal in the House can in fact sway the outcome in the Senate one way or the other.
Moreover, most individuals that do not vote informatively vote in favor of the proposal;
i.e., the fraction of members voting uninformatively against the proposal (the partisan-
conservatives) is relatively low across the different issue areas (as high as 6-7% for Foreign
Relations and Government Operations, substantially lower in all other issues). This is
consistent with the most informative EMR voting equilibrium, in which conservatives are
a blocking coalition in the receiving committee and all conservatives in the originating
committee vote informatively (we return to this below, where we examine the relationship
between type allocation and party label).
The bottom left panel shows the EMR voting equilibrium cutpoint in the receiving
committee. This is the smallest net number of favorable votes among individuals voting
informatively in the House for which the Senate passes the bill in equilibrium. The results
show that these EMR cutpoints are relatively large in all areas, with a smallest value of
23 in Judiciary, and a largest value of 108 in Appropriations.
The large EMR equilibrium cutpoints have two important implications. First, as it is
implied by the name, the EMR equilibrium cutpoint effectively imposes a supermajority
rule on the House, which can be computed given our estimates. Note that a cutpoint
ζ means that in order for the bill to pass the Senate, we need at least ζ net votes of
the members of the House voting informatively. This in turn means that if there are nY
partisan liberals and nN partisan conservatives, we need at least ζ + nY − nN net votes
out of all votes in total for the bill to pass the Senate (nY − nN is the net uninformative
tally). But this in turn means that in order for the bill to pass the Senate we need at
least ζ+nY −nN+n
2
positive votes in total to pass the Senate. Thus the rule for the entire
chamber is R = ζ+nY −nN+n
2
, or as a fraction of the membership,
R
n
=
1
2
+
ζ + nY − nN
2n
Similarly, we can compute the hurdle imposed on the set of individuals voting informa-
tively. This effective rule for the informative voters follows quite directly from the EMR
equilibrium cutpoint. Again, a cutpoint ζ means that in order for the bill to pass the
Senate, we need at least RI =
ζ+nI
2
positive votes among the nI members of the House
voting informatively. Thus, in terms of the fraction of the total number of individuals
voting informatively,
RI
nI
=
1
2
+
ζ
2nI
The bottom right panel shows R/n and RI/nI for each issue area. The implied
supermajority on the entire chamber is R/n ' 4/5 on average across areas. In other
words, bicameralism is transformed in equilibrium into a unicameral system with a 4/5
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supermajority rule. On the other hand, the threshold imposed on the members voting
informatively is about RI/nI ' 2/3 on average across areas. Both R/n and RI/nI have
significant variation across issue areas. In particular, the EMR R/n is relatively low
for Foreign Relations (0.62) and largest for Economic issues (0.87) and Appropriations
(0.89). Similarly, the hurdle for members voting informatively is relatively lower for
Foreign Relations (0.56) and Judiciary (0.55), and largest for Economic issues (0.72) and
Appropriations (0.80).
The large EMR cutpoints have a second important implication. The EMR cutpoints
are not only large in nominal terms, but also in relation with the value of private infor-
mation implicit in the estimates of q. Note that with q taking values above 0.85, the
public signal induced by the tally of votes in the House is very informative indeed: votes
that are not close (among informative voters) have a dramatic effect on the posterior
inference about the quality of the proposal. In fact, since Proposition 1 implies that
ζ = ρ, we can use (1), together with our estimates of q, p, and ζ to recover the bias
pi such that a (conservative) member would prefer the proposal to the status quo only
if Pr(ωA|E) ≥ piQ. The result of combining relatively informative signals and relatively
large cutpoints leave no room for ambiguity, implying piQ ≈ 1. In other words, the results
imply a very conservative blocking coalition in the Senate, in the sense that proposals
are enacted into law only when it is extremely likely that they are “good”.
Endogenous Classification of Amendments. To conclude the description of the
results for votes On Passage, we return to our treatment of amendments. Recall that
we assumed that the final outcome in the Senate is a binary up or down decision on the
passage of a bill zt ∈ {0, 1}. We treated zt ∈ {0, 1} as an unobservable variable from the
perspective of the econometrician. The econometrician can only observe an imperfect
signal zˆ ∈ {P,A, F} of zt ∈ {0, 1}, such that zˆt = F when zt = 0 with some probability η
(otherwise we observe it as amended), and that zˆt = P when zt = 1 with some probability
γ (otherwise we observe it as amended). The lower left panel shows the estimates of γ
and η. Note that η ≈ 0.59 while γ ≈ 0.36. This has an interesting implication in terms
of our endogenous classification of amended bills. Note that by Bayes’ rule, the posterior
probability of the bill having failed given that we observe an ammendment is
Pr(zt = 0|zˆt = A) = (1− η) Pr(zt = 0)
(1− η) Pr(zt = 0) + (1− γ) Pr(zt = 1)
We can estimate Pr(zt = 1) by the proportion of bills with an informative tally above the
equilibrium cutpoint. Doing this gives 0.48 for Appropriations, 0.65 for Economic issues,
0.80 for Foreign Relations, 0.34 for Government Operations, ' 0.40 for Judiciary, and
0.69 for Other issues. We then find that Pr(zt = 0|zˆt = A) = 0.41 for Appropriations,
0.26 for Economic issues, 0.13 for Foreign Relations, 0.55 for Government Operations,
0.49 for Judiciary, and 0.22 for Other issues. Thus we are classifying amended bills as
relatively likely to have passed in all areas. This is particularly so in Foreign Relations,
Other and Economic issues.
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6.1 Do Party Labels Explain Behavior?
In this paper, we have been completely agnostic about whether party labels might be
informative about the preferences or the behavior of members of Congress. In particular,
we chose not to identify members of the majority party as being predisposed in favor
of the proposal and members of the minority party as being predisposed against the
proposal. Doing so would have been unduly restrictive.
Having said this, it is reasonable to expect that at the very least, parties will tend to
bundle like-minded individuals. Thus it is interesting to see whether there is a correlation
between the types we identify in the analysis and their partisan affiliation. A particular
hypothesis of interest is that members of the majority party are typically biased in
favor of the proposal (and thus are partisan-liberal behavioral types, typically voting
in favor of the proposal independently of their private information), and that members
of the minority party are typically biased against the proposal, and then either vote
informatively or vote against the proposal independently of their private information
(partisan-conservative behavioral types). Is this hypothesis consistent with our results?
[Figure 6 about here]
The top panel in Figure 6 plots the proportion of members of the majority party
classified as partisan liberals (bar) and the proportion of members of the minority party
classified as informative voters (line) per congress and issue area for Appropriations,
Economic, and Other issues. Clearly enough, this fit the pattern. Although there are
some notable exceptions, in most periods and issues the individuals we classify as liberals
are (mostly) members of the majority, and the individuals that we classify as informative
are (mostly) members of the minority.
On the other hand, party labels are far from explaining all relevant behavior. The
lower panel in Figure 6 mimics the upper panel but for Foreign Relations, Government
Operations, and Judiciary. Here clearly the story is altogether different. While in these
areas there are some periods and issues for which we observe the same pattern as in the
previous case, this is not the norm. Instead, in several issue/Congress observations, a
majority of members of both parties vote informatively. Still in other instances, a sig-
nificant fraction of the minority party is classified as partisan-conservative. We conclude
that while party labels do explain some behavior - in particular within Appropriations
and Economic areas - party labels are generically a poor estimate for behavioral types in
our model. A more detailed analysis of the role of parties in this context is left for future
research.
7 Conclusion
This paper makes a significant contribution to the debate about the policy consequences
of adopting a bicameral legislative body. One set of consequences is well understood.
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Since at least Montesquieu (Montesquieu (1748)), bicameralism has been seen and used
as a tool to represent and protect the interests of special minorities (the aristocracy,
the states). Tsebelis and Money (1997) call this the political aspect of bicameralism.
There is a second, equally important argument in the debate, championed by Madison in
the Federalist papers (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison (1788)). This second aspect, which
Tsebelis and Money call the “efficiency” aspect of bicameralism, sees bicameralism as a
tool to improve the quality of political decisions. How this happens, and to what extent
does bicameralism actually enhance the quality of public policy is less understood.
In this paper, we explored the “efficiency” motivation of bicameralism. We showed,
first, that voting outcomes in both Houses are consistent with a model that incorporates
both ideology and common values into legislative decision-making, but not with the
simple purely ideological spatial model commonly used in the literature. We presented
a model consistent with common values and dispersed information, and argued that the
data are consistent with an equilibrium of the theoretical model in which the Senate only
approves House bills that pass an endogenous R-majority rule, determined in equilibrium.
We then estimated the parameters of the model using the votes of members of the House
and the Senate. We obtained three major conclusions:
(i) First, our estimates imply that private information (information dispersed in the
system that has not been made public and incorporated in the prior) is quite
important. For one, a large fraction of the House votes according to their private
information in each case (from 40% in the case of Appropriations bills, to a 50% in
Judiciary bills). Moreover, the results show that the informativeness or precision
of the signals is relatively large, above 0.85 in all issue areas.
(ii) Second, we showed that the implied supermajority on the entire chamber is R/n '
4/5 on average across areas. In other words, bicameralism is transformed in equi-
librium into a unicameral system with a four-fifths supermajority rule. This en-
dogenous majority rule has significant variation across areas: close to two thirds for
Foreign Relations, and larger for Economic issues (0.87) and Appropriations (0.89).
(iii) Third, we used the estimates to recover the bias piQ such that a (conservative)
member would prefer the proposal to the status quo only if Pr(ωA|E) ≥ piQ. The
result of combining relatively informative signals and relatively large cutpoints leave
no room for ambiguity, implying piQ ≈ 1. In other words, the results imply a very
conservative blocking coalition in the Senate, in the sense that proposals are enacted
into law only when it is extremely likely that their quality is high (or that they
constitute an appropriate response for the current state of the environment). The
results give credit to the genius of the Founding Fathers in establishing the Senate
as a counter-majoritarian device restraining the impulse of “sudden and violent
passions” that can prevail in the House (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison (1788)).
This paper also provides a significant methodological contribution to the analysis of
voting in legislatures. To our knowledge, our paper represents the first study to estimate a
model of voting in legislatures that allows for common values with dispersed information
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in an equilibrium context. This complements recent efforts in the literature to incorporate
strategic considerations to the analysis of voting in legislatures.
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Figure 2: Tally of Votes in the House and Outcomes in the Senate
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 Figure 3: Actual and Predicted Outcomes in the Senate according to the SSV Model
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Figure 6: Proportion of “Liberal” Types in the Majority Party and “Informative” Types
in the Minority Party, by Issue Area and Congress
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Figure 7: Robustness: Precision, Prior, Distribution of Types, and Endogenous Majority
Rule in votes On Passage with voting error µ estimated.
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Figure 8: Robustness: Precision, Prior, Distribution of Types, and Endogenous Majority
Rule in SRP votes with voting error µ estimated.
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Figure 9: Robustness: Voting Error µ for OP and SRP bills (µ estimated)
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